

UNM INSTITUTIONAL BIOSAFETY COMMITTEE (IBC)

Minutes

May 20, 2026

9:00 A.M. – 11:00 A.M.; Zoom Videoconference

Voting Members Present: (Quorum = 8)

- ☒ Coenraad Adema, PhD, UNM Department of Biology, IBC Co-Chair
- ☒ Steven Bradfute, PhD, HSC Department of Internal Medicine (Infectious Diseases)
- ☐ Tione Buranda, PhD, HSC Department of Pathology
- ☒ Eric Denkers, PhD, UNM Department of Biology
- ☒ Anastacia Griego-Fisher, PhD, NM SLD (Community Member)
- ☒ William 'Curt' Hines, PhD, HSC Department of Biochemistry and Molecular
- ☒ Julie In, PhD, HSC Department of Internal Medicine, Gastroenterology
- ☒ Tara Ooms Konecny, DVM, DACLAM, HSC Department of Pathology
- ☐ David N. Linsenbardt, PhD, HSC Department of Neurosciences
- ☒ Sharon Master, PhD, (Community Member)
- ☒ Tim Muller, MS, CBSP, HSC Office of Research, Biosafety Officer
- ☒ David Peabody, PhD, HSC Department of Molecular Genetics and Microbiology
- ☒ Graham Timmins, PhD, HSC College of Pharmacy, IBC Co-Chair
- ☒ Kevin Vlahovich, MD, HSC Department of Internal Medicine

Voting Members Absent:

Tione Buranda, PhD, HSC Department of Pathology
David N. Linsenbardt, PhD, HSC Department of Neurosciences

Visitors & Non-Voting Members Present:

Virginia Severns, HSC Office of Research, Biosafety Specialist
Amanda Brothers, Animal Care Compliance Specialist
Bradley Dolin, JD, UNM Health Sciences HRPP Director

1. Call to Order:

- Dr. Coenraad Adema

a. Announcements

- Sharon Master, Anastacia M. Griego-Fisher, and Tione Buranda will be stepping away from their roles with the IBC.

2. Approval of last meeting minutes:

- February 18, 2026

3. Old Business:

- None

4. New Business:

- General discussion concerning the use of disinfectants on IBC protocols.

5. Protocols Approved (Previously Reviewed):

- 837 (BRADST 24-11-01 A)
- 839 (OHIORY 25-11-01R)
- 843 (MANDMI 26-02-01R)
- 844 (FRIEKA 26-02-01)
- 845 (DENKER 26-02-01R)
- 846 (KIMOTA 26-02-01R)
- 847 (BRADST 25-05-01R A)

6. Protocols Pending (Contingencies)

- 821 (DEREVO 25-05-01R)
- 827 (MILLER 25-05-01R)
- 834 (WHEECO 25-08-01)
- 835 (WEICJA 23-05-01R A)

7. New Protocols for Review (requires IBC review and approval)

IBC ID: 849 (FRIEKA 26-05-01)

PI: Fietze

Title: Laboratory based assays with Bordetella pertussis

Description: The Fietze Laboratory will be adding Bordetella pertussis to our has experience making VLP based vaccines against different infectious diseases. Whooping cough is a respiratory illness caused by a type of bacteria called Bordetella pertussis. The disease is only found in humans. Currently the vaccine for Bordetella pertussis requires multiple vaccinations, and in some populations does not have long last efficacy. We believe our VLP platform will provide long lasting, protective immunity. We will be growing and titrating stocks of Bordetella pertussis. We will test the ability of mouse sera to neutralize Bordetella pertussis infection of cells using a neutralization assay. We will look at in vivo infection to see if our vaccines offer protection. We will test if antibodies can cross through the placental barrier. We will also test if we can prevent transmission in nests during the neonatal time frame.

Agents: *Bordetella pertussis*

Human Material: No

Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid: None

Wild-type: Yes

Proposed BSL: A/BSL-2

Reviewer: Denkers

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted. **Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at A/BSL-2:**

1. Correct text in sentence 1 of the Lay Summary. Does not make sense as written.
2. In the lay abstract indicate that mice are used for experiments that look at in vivo infection to see about vaccine protection and at testing antibody crossing the placental barrier.
3. Throughout the protocol, please ensure that all spelling errors are corrected, including replacing 'tittering' (meaning laughing nervously) with titering.
4. Abstract: "Due to our vigilant use of PPE and low infection concentrations, we are not currently concerned about laboratory acquired infection of this bacteria." Justify why you are not concerned with laboratory infections with Bordetella (which is a BSL2 pathogen) and low infection concentrations. Addendum D.4 specifies 10e8 CFU/ml. Modify the abstract by removing this sentence.
5. Explain why two strains (WT versus Pertussis toxin-deleted) are used. Will these be used at the same time, or deletion strain first, then WT?
6. Indicate whether VLPs are purchased or generated in the UNM lab.
7. Describe how lung tissue from mice is homogenized while preventing aerosol formation.
8. For the neonatal transmission model, specify tissues to be homogenized for assessment of protection.
9. If sharps will be used, please provide appropriate safety and disposal information.
10. Under facilities (page 3), check BSL-2 indicated for ARF room with 2 BSCs.
11. Final concentration of bleach should be 10%. Also, for spills, the contact time should be 10 minutes.
12. Describe precautions to be used when working with purified pertussis toxin.
13. In section III. 1. Shoe covers are no longer required in the ARF.
14. On page 6. Document that 10% bleach for 30 min neutralizes Pertussis toxin.

IBC ID: 850 (KAWAAL 26-05-01R)

PI: Kawa

Title: Cholinergic interneurons and cue-induced cocaine craving

Description: A major problem for persons suffering from addiction is persistent vulnerability to relapse, even after long periods of abstinence. In the incubation of cocaine craving model of relapse, rats self-administer cocaine using a Long Access procedure and then experience a prolonged abstinence period. During abstinence, rats exhibit a progressive intensification (incubation) of cue-induced cocaine craving. Plasticity involving medium spiny neurons in the nucleus accumbens core (NAcc) is required for the expression of 'incubated' cue-induced craving. However, to date no incubation studies have focused on another cell type in the NAcc, the Cholinergic Interneuron (CIN). CINs make up only 1-2% of NAcc neurons, but are critically involved in learning, memory, and motivated behaviors. CINs are tonically active, and considerable work now supports the idea that a reduction in their activity augments motivated behavior.

Agents: AAV vector (AAV1,2,5,8,9; AAV-D, Retrograde AAV) with rRNA inserts (CChannelrhodopsin-2 (ChR2), ChrimsonR, GRAB-Ado, GRAB-Ado mutant, GRAB-ATP, GRAB-ATP mutant, GRAB-Ado-med, IV-GFPL10, DIO-hM4D- (Gi), DIO-hM3D (Gq), DIO-mCherry, GRAB-DA, GRAB-DA mutant, GRAB-rDA, FLEX-GCaMP, SPOTlight, DIO-SPOTlight, GRAB-Ach, GRAB-rAch, Halorhodopsin (eNpHR), DIO-Halorhodopsin, DIO-Channelrhodopsin).

Plasmid: pAAV-hSyn-hChR2(H134R)-EYFP, pAAV-hSyn-ChrimsonR-tdTomato, pAAV-hSyn-GRAB_Ado1.0, pAAV-hSyn-GRAB_Ado1.0mut, pAAV-hSyn-GRAB_ATP1.0, pAAV-hSyn-GRAB_ATP1.0mut, pAAV-hSyn-GRAB_Ado1.0med, pAAV-EF1a-IV-GFPL10, pAAV-hSyn-DIO-hM4D(Gi)-mCherry, pAAV-hSyn-DIO-

hM3D(Gq)-mCherry, pAAV-hSyn-DIO-mCherry, pAAV-hSyn-GRAB_gDA3m, pAAV-hSyn-GRAB_DA-mut, pAAV-hSyn-GRAB_rDA3m, pAAV-hSyn-FLEX-jGCaMP8s-WPRE, pAAV-CAG-SPOTlight-U2GCR, pAAV-CAG-DIO-SPOTlight-U2GCR, pAAV-hSyn-GRAB_Ach3.0, pAAV-hSyn-eNpHR3.0-EYFP, pAAV-EF1a-DIO-eNpHR3.0-EYFP, pAAV-EF1a-double floxed-hChR2(H134R)-EYFP.

Human Material: No

Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid: III-E, III-D-4

Wild-type: No

Proposed BSL: A/BSL-1 with A/BSL-2 practices

Reviewer: Bradfute

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted. **Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at A/BSL-1 with A/BSL-2 Practices:**

1. Section V. PI says that rats are being housed in micro-isolator cages for beyond the 7 days required post AAV surgery, but typically rats are in open top caging and would be open when moved to operant chambers. Please indicate micro-isolators for only 7 days.
2. Section V. 1. Indicate micro-isolators for 7 days, then transferred to open top caging.
3. Section V. 10. Only the carcasses that die during the first 7 days are handled as biohazards. After 7 days, they are incinerated with the rest of the waste.

IBC ID: 852 (YANGXU 26-05-01R)

PI: Yang

Title: Immunity and Inflammation Mechanisms

Description: Our research activities include the identification of genes/proteins that may be involved in immune and inflammatory responses and their associated diseases. We plan to over-express, or inhibit these proteins in established cell lines, or in primary cultures, to study their function by using retroviral vectors (or pcDNA3). It is important to note that the engineered ecotropic virions are not infective for human cells and replication deficient. The whole experiments will follow the safety procedure for handling live retrovirus

Agents: Gammaretrovirus (Murine leukemia virus); E.coli (JM109, DH5a, Top10, XL1-blue, Pir2) rNA gene inserts RORa, RORgt, Tbet, Gata3, Foxp3, Card6, GFP, CD2, CD5, RFP, PuroR, Mnab, Xbpls, Ddit3, Wasp, ShRNA, siRNA, Cas9.

Plasmid: pMSCV-IRES-x (X=GFP/CD2/CD5/RFP), pcDNA3, pBluescript.

Human Material: Yes (packaging cell line, BSL-2)

Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid: III-E and III-D-4

Wild-type: N/A

Proposed BSL: A/BSL-1 with A/BSL-2 practices (ecotropic viral vector)

Reviewer: In

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted. **Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at A/BSL-1 with A/BSL-2 practices (ecotropic viral vector):**

1. Update section II(1) and select the A/BSL-2 checkbox for the flow cytometer facility.
2. Remove the word Steriplex from the protocol (page 6).
3. Update Section V(5)(b) to increase the wet contact time for spills to at least 5 minutes. For longer wet contact times, PREempt should be used on metal surfaces. Bleach may be used on non-metal surfaces for extended wet contact times.
4. The lay abstract is uninformative; provide a model organism and an example of the immune factor/disease studied.
5. Update Addendum C, II: In the insert table, instead of “etc,” provide all insert targets for “Small hairpin/interference RNA (targets: Cis, Alpk2, Card6, etc)”.
6. Section V indicates the use of packaging cell lines, but Addendum C(III)(f) indicates they will not be used. Please clarify their use within the protocol.
7. In section II (1), ARF room is checked as ABSL-2. The ARF room is not an ABSL-2 facility. Please uncheck the ABSL2 box. Also, Section V(3)...you stated that “all rooms are marked with BSL-2 signs,” and ARF room is not ABSL-2. Please communicate with the Biosafety Officer and ARF, weather modification is needed.
8. Provide CVs for your personnel.

NOTE: Dr. Julie In was placed in the waiting room during the review of 853 (IN00JU 26-05-01R).

IBC ID: 853 (IN00JU 26-05-01R)

PI: In

Title: Epithelial response to luminal toxicants

Description: The intestinal epithelium makes up the ‘gut barrier’ and must remain intact to protect the peripheral internal organs. The gut is under near constant assault from ingested (luminal) toxicants but has a high regenerative capacity. This protocol is for experiments that seek to identify how various luminal toxicants alter the molecular profile in the gut epithelia. Previously, human colonic organoids were exposed to various toxicants and processed for single cell RNA sequencing. The sequencing analysis identified novel transcription factors that may be part of the epithelial regenerative response. Human colonic organoids will be used to validate the sequencing results. shRNAs in lentiviruses will be used to transduce the organoids and knock-down genes of interest to determine the regulatory pathways essential for regeneration. Commensal and non-pathogenic strains of Escherichia coli will be used to mimic gut commensals and determine if changes in epithelial function also alters the bacterial transcriptome and predisposes them to become pathobionts.

Agents: Lentivirus vector with rNA inserts (Sh-scramble, Sh-DHH, Sh-WNT2B, Sh-GLI1, Sh-SHH, Sh-MUC2, Sh-PROX1, Sh-NEUROG3, Sh-NEUROD1, ORF-DHH, ORF-PROX1, ORF-NEUROG3, ORF-NEUROD1)

Human Material: Yes

Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid: III-D-3-a

Wild-type: No

Proposed BSL: BSL-2

Reviewer: Peabody

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted. **Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at BSL-2:**

1. Update reference related to EOHS standard business hours (i.e., 8:00AM-4:00PM).
2. Work with biosafety to clarify disinfectant wet contact times for V(5)(a) & (b). After clarification, updates sections V, V(5)(a) & (b) and other references. The listed times are typically longer than needed under routine conditions.
3. The protocol indicates biohazard bags used within the BSC will be changed every other day. Bags should be securely closed, surface decontaminated and discarded within a secondary biological waste container within the lab at the end of the experiment. Update protocol accordingly.
4. Transport containers must be appropriately identified.
5. There should be more information on the heavy metals being used. How are lab personnel protected? How are they disposed of? Which metals are being used? Biosafety and EHS will work together to provide guidance.
6. Resolve lab inspection deficiencies.

NOTE: Dr. Coenraad Adema was placed in the Waiting Room during the review of 854 (LOKEER 26-05-01).

IBC ID: 854 (LOKEER 26-05-01)

PI: Loker

Title: Biology of trematode parasites and snail hosts

Description: We study flatworm parasites, their (immune-)interactions with freshwater snails (obligatory intermediate hosts) and snail biology to understand parasite phylogeny, parasite/snail host specificity and snail-mediated parasite transmission to vertebrates. Main focus is on *Schistosoma mansoni*, (blood fluke, human parasite), but studies may include related human blood flukes (genus *Schistosoma*), non-human blood flukes, and non-blood fluke digenetic trematodes. We employ BSL2 facilities to routinely maintain *S. mansoni* using *Biomphalaria glabrata*, *Biomphalaria pfeifferi* and occasionally other *Biomphalaria* species (tropical freshwater snails) as intermediate host and rodents as vertebrate host. Occasionally, other species of snails and parasites (requiring rodent or other animal hosts) are maintained for limited time intervals (weeks-months).

Agents: *Schistosoma (mansoni, PR1 strain, Kenya isolate, haematobium, japonicum)*, *Biomphalaria glabrata*, *Biomphalaria pfeifferi*, *Schistosomatidae (Heterobilharzia americana, Heterobilharzia sp., Trichobilharzia sp., Gigantabilharzia sp., Dendritobilharzia sp., Bilharziella sp., Macrobilharzia sp., Ornithobilharzia sp., Austrobilharzia sp.)*. Superfamilies Strigeoidea, Paramphistomoidea, Ophistorchioidea, Echinostomatoidae, *Fasciola hepatica*.

Human Material: No

Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid: None

Wild-type: Yes

Proposed BSL: A/BSL-2

Reviewer: Ooms

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted. **Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at A/BSL-2.**

1. On page 3, Eye protection should be mandatory, not just available.
2. On page 5 (Section V), the animal room is 1P for Mice and 1M Hamsters, not just Biol 1 (ARF).
3. On page 5 (Section V), the birds have not been used and are not currently approved on the UNM IACUC protocol. Please clarify whether this model is still in use.
4. On page 6, PI references the 5th edition of the BMBL; please update. Please update with appropriate sections of the 6th edition of the BMBL.
5. Update section V(5)(b) to at least 5 minutes.
6. Clarify section V(7) the disposal of biological waste for all protocol rooms (e.g., gloves, misc. lab waste).
7. On page 6, PI says that eye protection is offered, but only required when working with infected water or animals. This is confusing and not in compliance with the 6th edition of BMBL, which states, "For example, in addition to gloves, long-sleeved laboratory coats and face shields or other protective garb should be worn when working in the immediate area of aquaria or other water sources that may contain schistosome cercariae." It seems the lab should wear eye protection whenever working in the snail aquarium room because it may contain infectious organisms.
8. Clarify what type of container mice and hamsters will be placed in during the cercaria exposure. The protocol indicates the animals will be placed in a glass dish containing parasites, but will the glass dish be placed in a cage or another type of secondary container?
9. Will disposable gloves be worn under the Atlas 772 nitrile coated gloves? When will the reusable gloves be replaced? How will you determine if the gloves have been compromised (e.g., develop a small hole or crack that could expose the researcher)?
10. Spill cleanup – final bleach concentration must be 10% and contact time 10 min.
11. Glass pipettes are considered sharps. How will they be disposed of and/or decontaminated?
12. Addendum A – These are old IACUC numbers. The PI currently has 24-201546-MC for studies in Kenya. Approval date is 8/15/2024. This has mice, hamster and chicken and 25-201666-MC for UNM. Approval date is 5/15/2025. Species are only mice and hamsters, and no birds.
13. Addendum A. 4.c. Rooms are 1M- hamsters, 1P mice.
14. Addendum A. 5. A. PI does not have any birds approved for use in UNM, only Kenya.
15. Addendum D. II. B. Rooms are incorrect. The correct rooms are above.
16. Addendum D. I. 4. & 9 & 14 & 19. The PI previously said the PI infects with 150 cercaria/ml, not 500 cercaria/ml. Please clarify.
17. Addendum D. 12. & 17 d & e. Please fix the door numbers and clarify if birds will be used at UNM for this protocol.
18. Resolve lab inspection deficiencies.

8. Significant Modifications

IBC ID: 851 (KELLAL 24-11-01R B)

PI: Kell

Title: Virus-host interactions and immunity

Description: We are investigating a set of host proteins that appear to be required for efficient replication of Seoul virus in human and rat endothelial cells. To identify the step in the viral infection cycle at which these host proteins are required, we generated CRISPR knockout cells for each of the host proteins and will measure binding of viral particles to host cells, entry of virus particles into the host cell, RNA genome replication, protein synthesis, and particle release. To study viral entry in the absence of all the other downstream steps, we will utilize a VSV-GFP pseudotyping system. Vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV) readily

infects and replicates into almost all mammalian cells. VSV has been engineered by many different groups to express a green fluorescent protein (GFP) when it enters and begins mRNA transcription and protein production. Pseudotyping is the process of generating a virus that contains the native genome without its glycoprotein studded with glycoproteins from the other virus. Our colleague will send us a VSV-GFP that is coated with the Seoul virus glycoprotein to study the ability of the Seoul virus glycoprotein to mediate entry in cells lacking our host factors of interest.

Agents: Vesiculovirus (vesicular stomatitis virus without glycoprotein- VSV-GFP SEOV G) with rNA insert (Seoul virus glycoproteins, ORF of the viral M segment, Vesicular stomatitis virus glycoprotein – pVSV-G, pCMV-Lopt, pCMV-Popt, pCMV-Nopt, pVSVdG-eGFP-linker.

Plasmid: pCAGGS vector optimized for expression in mammalian cells, pCMV vector – pVSV-G, pCMV-Lopt, pCMV-Popt, pCMV-Nopt, pVSVdG-eGFP-linker

Human Material: Yes

Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid: III-D-3-a

Wild-type: No

Proposed BSL: BSL-2

Reviewer: Adema

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted. **Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at BSL-2.**

IBC ID: 830 (VALECA 25-05-01R A)

PI: Valenzuela

Title: Optogenetic/chemogenetic characterization of neuronal function in a mouse model of fetal alcohol spectrum disorder

Description: This significant protocol modification has been submitted to request the use and deliver of novel viral vectors with gene inserts ('AAV-sh-scramble', 'AAV-shFGF14', 'AAV-shGSK3beta', 'AAV-GFP'). These viral vectors will be stereotactically injected into the brains of mice where it will be taken up by cells to either 1) decreases gene expression of specific gene products (FGF14 and GSK3B), 2) do nothing (i.e. serve as control), or 3) only label infected cells with GFP.

Agents: AAV-sh-scramble, AAV-shFGF14, AAV-shGSK3beta, AAV-GFP

Human Material: No

Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid: III-E and III-D-4

Wild-type: No

Proposed BSL: A/BSL-1 with A/BSL-2 practices

Reviewer: Hines

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted. **Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at A/BSL-1 with A/BSL-2 practices.**

1. Revise Addendum F (Lay Summary) to clarify the exact material administered to animals. The current wording states that "plasmids" will be injected using AAV vectors, which appears inconsistent with other sections referring to viral vectors/virus.
2. Communicate with ARF for housing of experimental animals.

3. Resolve laboratory inspection deficiencies.
4. Please add all personnel to the protocol.

IBC ID: 855 (BRADST 22-11-01 F)

PI: Bradfute

Title: Analysis of therapeutics and neutralizing antibody responses against non-select agent BSL-3 viruses

Description: Under the original protocol mice were vaccinated against Alphaviruses: Venezuelan (VEEV), Western (WEEV), and Eastern (EEEV) equine encephalitis. Serum from these mice were used for in vitro assays to evaluate immune responses such as the presence of neutralizing antibodies, specifically plaque reduction neutralization assays (PRNT). Here we request the addition of five non-select agent alphaviruses. These viruses would be used to repeat PRNT assays and determine if vaccine candidates provide cross protection against additional alphaviruses. All procedures would be performed as described in the original protocol methods objective 1. Additional agents include to the following BSL3 agents: VEEV strains Mena II and 3880, Mucambo virus (MUCV) strain BeAn 8, and Everglades virus (EVEV) strain FE3-73; as well as BSL2 agent Pixuna virus (PIXV) strain BeAr 35645. All viruses are part of the VEEV complex but do not belong to subclades designated as select agents and toxins. This viruses would be used to conduct additional neutralization assays using serum from mice vaccinated against VEEV, WEEV, or EEEV under the original protocol. The purpose of this work is to determine if vaccine candidates provided cross-protection against additional related viruses.

Agents: Mucambo virus (Mucambo virus strain BeAn 8), Everglades virus (Everglades virus strain FE3-7C), Pixuna virus (Pixuna virus BeAr 35645), Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus [subclade IE] (VEEV Strain 3880, VEEV Mena II).

Human Material: No

Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid: None

Wild-type: Yes

Proposed BSL: BSL-3

Reviewer: Timmins

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted. **Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at BSL-3.**

9. Notifications (administrative approvals by BHC)

Notifications are simultaneous with initiation

- None

Personnel Addition / Removal

- 682 (HINEWI 22-02-01R); Removal
- 726 (NEUMAA 23-05-01); Removal
- 730 (LEEODA 23-05-01R); Removal & Addition
- 690 ADAMSA 22-05-01R; addition
- 732 (FRIEKA 23-05-01R); Removal & Addition

- 738 (CANNJU 23-08-01): Removal & Addition
- 749 (PALAVI 23-08-01R); Addition
- 784 (LIUOME 24-05-01R); Addition
- 803 (KELLAL 24-11-01R); Addition
- 816 (BOYCAN 25-05-01R); Addition
- 819 (VALECA 25-05-01R); Removal
- 820 (FRIEKA 25-05-01); Removal & Addition
- 831 (MCKESA 25-08-01R); Addition

Room Changes

- 682 HINEWI 22-02-01R
- 757 (ELGHAM 23-11-01)
- 771 MCQUAN 24-02-01R

Other Admin Changes

- None

10. Protocol Closures-

- 646 ZHANSI 21-05-01N
- 647 DEREVO 21-05-01R
- 649 YANGXU 21-05-01R
- 652 HURWIV 21-05-01R
- 656 IN00JU 21-05-01R
- 658 LOKEER 21-05-01R

11. Annual Reviews -

- 688 BRINJE 22-05-01R
- 690 ADAMSA 22-05-01R
- 726 NEUMAA 23-05-01
- 730 LEE0DA 23-05-01R
- 732 FRIEKA 23-05-01R
- 733 WEICJA 23-05-01R
- 735 BRADST 23-05-01
- 783 HIGHKA 24-05-01
- 784 LIUOME 24-05-01R
- 785 BURATI 24-05-01
- 789 PODDRA 24-05-01R
- 816 BOYCAN 25-05-01R
- 817 SALIIR 25-05-01R
- 819 VALECA 25-05-01R
- 820 FRIEKA 25-05-01

- 823 BRADST 25-05-01R

12. Adjourn –10:21 am