# UNM INSTITUTIONAL BIOSAFETY COMMITTEE (IBC)

**Minutes**
**November 12, 2025**
**9:00 A.M. – 11:00 A.M.; Zoom Videoconference**

**Voting Members Present: (Quorum = 8)**

☒ Coenraad Adema, PhD, UNM Department of Biology, IBC Co-Chair
☒ Steven Bradfute, PhD, HSC Department of Internal Medicine (Infectious Diseases)
☒ Tione Buranda, PhD, HSC Department of Pathology
☒ Eric Denkers, PhD, UNM Department of Biology
☐ Anastacia Griego-Fisher, PhD, NM SLD (Community Member)
☐ William 'Curt' Hines, PhD, HSC Department of Biochemistry and Molecular
☐ Julie In, PhD, HSC Department of Internal Medicine, Gastroenterology
☐ David N. Linsenbardt, PhD, HSC Department of Neurosciences
☐ Sharon Master, PhD (Community Member)
☒ Tim Muller, MS, CBSP, HSC Office of Research, Biosafety Officer
☒ Tara Ooms Konecny, DVM, DACLAM, HSC Department of Pathology
☒ David Peabody, PhD, HSC Department of Molecular Genetics and Microbiology
☒ Graham Timmins, PhD, HSC College of Pharmacy, IBC Co-Chair
☒ Kevin Vlahovich, MD, HSC Department of Internal Medicine

**Voting Members Absent:**

Anastacia Griego-Fisher, PhD, NM SLD (Community Member)
William 'Curt' Hines, PhD, HSC Department of Biochemistry and Molecular
Julie In, PhD, HSC Department of Internal Medicine, Gastroenterology
David N. Linsenbardt, PhD, HSC Department of Neurosciences
Sharon Master, PhD (Community Member)

**Visitors & Non-Voting Members Present:**

Virginia Severns, HSC Office of Research, Biosafety Specialist
Amanda Brothers, Animal Care Compliance Specialist
Bradley Dolin, JD, UNM Health Sciences HRPP Director

1. **Call to Order:**

   - Dr. Graham Timmins

   a. **Announcements**

   - None

2. **Approval of last meeting minutes:**

- August 20, 2025

3. **Old Business:**

   - None

4. **New Business:**

   - General discussion concerning the use of disinfectants on IBC protocols.

5. **Protocols Approved (Previously Reviewed):**

   - 822 (BRADST 23-02-01R E)
   - 826 (BRADST 22-11-01 D)
   - 828 (BHASKI 25-08-01)
   - 829 (BARTER 24-11-01R A)
   - 832 (BRADST 22-11-01 E)
   - 831 (MCKESA 25-08-01R)
   - 833 (ENDIJO 24-08-01R A)

6. **Protocols Pending (Contingencies)**

   - 821 (DEREVO 25-05-01R)
   - 823 (BRADST 25-05-01R)
   - 827 (MILLER 25-05-01R)
   - 834 (WHEECO 25-08-01)

7. **New Protocols for Review (requires IBC review and approval)**

   **IBC ID:** 836 (MITRAN 25-11-01R)
   **PI:** Mitra
   **Title:** Regulation of ovarian cancer metastasis
   **Description:** My laboratory seeks to understand the paracrine and juxtacrine interactions between cancer cells and their microenvironment that regulate metastatic colonization in ovarian cancer. We are using patient tumors, in vitro organotypic 3D culture models, ovarian cancer spheroids, mouse xenograft models of metastasis and live 3D time-lapse microscopy to study the reciprocal interactions between the metastasizing cancer cells with their microenvironment at the site of metastasis. We are specifically interested in the regulation of key microRNAs and transcription factors by these paracrine/juxtacrine interactions and the mechanism by which they drive metastatic colonization in ovarian cancer. We are also studying the role of the cancer associated fibroblasts in the tumor microenvironment in chemotherapy resistance, metastasis induction and immune tolerance.
   **Agents:** Lentiviral Vector (HIV1-derived, Replication Incompetent Strain) rNA gene inserts (CRISPR, KO, pl-CRISPR_CAS_GFP (addgene), pGEX-6p-Z-EHD1, pGEX-6p-Z-EH1, MSCV-beta-catenin, pEZX- MT05-BAG5 3' UTR Target clone, pEZX- MT05-BAG5 3' UTR mutated Target clone, M50 Super 8X TOP Flash, M51 Super 8X FOP Flash (TOP Flash mutant), pl-CRISPR CAS GFP, pRL SV 40, pcDNA3 EGFP-Myc-EHD1, pcDNA3 EGFP-Myc-EHD1 EH domain deleted, pcDNA3 EGFP-Myc-EHD1 G65R, pcDNA3 EGFP-MICAL-L1, pEGFP-Puro-miR-

zip-193b, pEGFP-Puro, pLightSwitch 3' UTR, pLightSwitch_PLAU_3UTR, pLightSwitch_CCL5_3UTR, pGL3 Luciferase reporter vector, LifeAct Luc GFP, pPACKH1 Packaging vector, pCMV-VSV-G, PMIRH193bPA-1 (System Biosciences), pSMART hCMV/TURBO GFP miR-4454).
Plasmids: pQCXIH- ETS1, pQCXIH ETS1 T38A/S41A (DN ETS1), pQCXIH ETS1 T38E/S41E (Active ETS1), pQCXIH- ETS2, pQCXIH- ETV4, pQCXIH- ERG, pWZL-Neo-Myr-Flag-DEST, pWZL-Neo-Myr-Flag-PTK2, pBABE-neo-hTERT).
**Human Material:** Yes
**Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid:** III-D-3-a and III-D-4
**Wild-type:** No
**Proposed BSL:** A/BSL-2
**Reviewer:** Adema

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted**. Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at A/BSL-2 practices:**

1. Indicate whether these reagents are purchased from a specific commercial supplier or are produced in the laboratory at UNM.
2. In Addendum C, II (briefly) describe insert function in column 2 (provide additional details for gene inserts and functions C(II), (e.g., spell out abbreviations for gene inserts. For example, mIR193b is listed under C(II) as is with no further description within the protocol. Clarify if all inserts listed will be incorporated into lentiviral vectors.
3. Clarify the difference among the 9 plasmids listed in Add C III. Edit "plasmid source" to indicate the supplier, or the specific lab of origin. Provide maps for all (9) vectors referenced in the protocol.
4. Update section I of the protocol to document the completion of required biosafety training (e.g., Bio-H 111) and provide a CV or resume.
5. Update section II of the protocol to document the use of a safety centrifuge. Please consult with the BSO/BSS.
6. In Section II, add ARF rooms to the Facility list. Also, add other In Vitro labs, which are under construction. Confirm and add (as needed) the use of an ABSL-2 procedure room on the protocol when administering human cells.
7. Section V.1. Typically, rodents injected with human tumor cells are not treated as infectious waste, so delete the reference to the cages being autoclaved. Animals can still be housed in ABSL-2 without having to autoclave the waste. Also, carcasses would not be disposed of as infectious, but could still be incinerated. Also, once the mouse is injected with tumors, they are not considered hazardous to personnel. I know we typically use the cabinet for injections and for the animals being immunodeficient, but I do not think animals with tumors are innately risky to touch or be exposed to.
8. Section V. 10. These are just regular animal carcasses, which are incinerated, and these do not need to be double-bagged in biohazard bags. Confirm with ARF or remove from the protocol.
9. The protocol documents the marking of cages with biohazard labels. Confirm this practice with the ARF or remove it from the protocol.
10. The protocol documents contaminated bedding will be autoclaved. Clarify with the ARF which cages they intend to autoclave prior to processing. Section V(9) of the protocol and the referenced ARF SOP would typically cover the proposed experiments.
11. Update addendum A with relevant details once available (e.g., IACUC approval, etc.).

**PI:** Mitra
**Title:** Identify the perturbed signaling mechanisms that promote cancer cell adaptation to proteotoxic and chemotherapy stress.
**Description:** A rapidly growing tumor has various growth-limiting conditions, such as nutrient deficiency, hypoxia, oxidative stress, and high metabolic demand, which lead to disturbances in the endoplasmic reticulum (ER) homeostasis and ER stress. If ER stress is prolonged or severe, the unfolded protein response is activated to induce cell death. However, cancer cells acquire various adaptive mechanisms that help their growth and progression. The focus of my research is to identify the perturbed signaling mechanisms that provide resistance to ER stress and promote cancer cell growth and chemoresistance. Targeting these adaptive mechanisms will not only inhibit cancer cell growth but will also sensitize them to conventional chemotherapy. We are also testing novel inhibitors that induce ER or proteotoxic stress and promote cancer cell death. We hypothesize that ER stress-mediated signaling promotes chemoresistance, and inducing proteotoxic stress will promote cell killing in the chemoresistant cells.
**Agents:** Lentiviral Vector rNA gene insert (ERN1 & control): Plasmid: CLP-U0057-LV105 (Lentiviral particle for gene, ERN1), CLP-Neg-LV105 (negative control lentiviral particle).
**Human Material:** Yes
**Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid:** III-D-3-a
**Wild-type:** No
**Proposed BSL:** BSL-2
**Reviewer:** Bradfute

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted**. Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at BSL-2 practices:**

1. Section V.8. Please check “yes” to confirm that ARF SOP-08 will be followed.
2. Section V.10. Animals will be biohazards when infectious with viral vectors; otherwise, biohazard bags are not required for carcass incineration.
3. Addendum A can be removed, since neither sections 1 nor section 2 were checked.
4. Please add maps of all plasmids to be used.
5. How will UCHL1, PSMA7, and APEH be overexpressed or silenced within cell lines (Project 1)? Work with the biosafety office to support this protocol update.
6. Project 2 does not appear to be subject to the NIH Guidelines or the IBC scope of review. Work with the biosafety office to help clarify the applicability of this section to the IBC.
7. The protocol indicates patient-derived cancer cells (genetically unmodified) will be intraperitoneally injected into mice, and the mice will be treated with proteasome inhibitors. It appears the disclosed animal experiments are not subject to the NIH Guidelines or the IBC scope of review. Exempt experiments should be removed from the protocol sections (V, V(1), V(2), V(4), V(10), and Addendum A.
8. Laboratories or storage areas that do not involve the use of IBC covered agents should be omitted from the protocol. The PI’s Biological Inventory should be used to document the use and storage of IBC and non-IBC covered biological agents.
9. Addendum C (II) and (III)(2)(e) need to be completed. Additional updates may be required after consulting with the BSO/BSS.
10. Resolve laboratory inspection deficiencies.
11. Protocol personnel need to complete the required training.

12. The PI and the BSO/BSS should meet prior to revising the protocol.

**IBC ID:** 839 (OHI0RY 25-11-01R)
**PI:** Ohi
**Title:** Biology and Biochemistry of the Microtubule Cytoskeleton
**Description:** We focus on the microtubule cytoskeleton, a system of filaments that assemble from the protein tubulin. Microtubules are required for myriad functions in the cell and our major questions revolve around how microtubules are post-translationally modified to increase their functional versatility. We study how cells select microtubules for post-translational modification (PTM), how PTMs affect the binding of microtubule associated proteins (MAPs) with microtubules, and ultimately how PTMs affect the ability of microtubule-based arrays to function.
**Agents:** Alphabaculovirus and Lentiviral vector (Eugene Makeyev (pEM584)) rNA inserts (TOG, EML2, CAMSAP, RASSF1, WHAMM, NuSAP, TPPP, EB, Tubulin, KIF5, KIF15, HSET, PRC1, Eg5, CLIP170, A1aY1, KIF18A).
**Human Material:** Yes
**Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid:** III-D-3-a and III-E
**Wild-type:** No
**Proposed BSL:** BSL-2
**Reviewer:** Peabody
The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted**. Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at BSL-2 practices:**

1. Provide acknowledgment that the spill clean-up procedures posted in the lab (V)(5) will be followed.
2. Update addendum C(II) to cover all viral vector gene inserts for baculoviruses and lentiviruses, including gRNA and Cas9 inserts.
3. In support of the review process, document all viral vectors and their corresponding gene inserts in separate addendum C(s) (e.g., C(I)(II)(III)).
4. Check “no” in Addendum C(III)(b) in answer to the question “is the viral vector replication defective?”
5. Verify that the concentration provided for E. coli in Addendum C is correct.
6. Provide referenced plasmid maps.
7. The wet surface contact times for routine surface disinfection with 10% bleach or PREempt RTU could be reduced to 1 minute. Compliance office recommends using non-corrosive disinfectants (e.g., PREempt) on metal surfaces.
8. Resolve laboratory inspection deficiencies.
9. Provide a short title for the protocol in section I.2.

**Chairmanship transferred to Dr. Adema prior to Dr. Timmins review of 840 (WU00TE 25-11-01).**

**IBC ID:** 840 (WU00TE 25-11-01)
**PI:** Wu
**Title:** Evaluation of Medical Countermeasures against Respiratory Pathogens in ABSL-3/SA Lab
**Description:** The primary mission of the ABSL-3/Select Agent laboratory is to facilitate the development and evaluation of novel vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics against bacterial and viral biothreat pathogens. We also support other investigators who need access to a fully equipped ABSL-3/Select Agent

laboratory and well-trained scientists with expertise necessary to perform complex studies in this environment
**Agents:** Francisella *tularensis* (SCHU S4, MA00-2987, holartica R96-0246); Yersinia *pestis* CO92
**Human Material:** No
**Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid:** N/A
**Wild-type:** Yes
**Proposed BSL:** A/BSL-3
**Reviewer:** Timmins

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted**. Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at A/BSL-3 practices:**

1. Lab Reg/ Select Agent Program # needed (page 18, box II).
2. Update section (V(1) to document that safety centrifuge devices will be surface decontaminated prior to removing from the BSC and after centrifugation procedures.
3. Clarify if urine samples will be filtered in addition to heat inactivation in section (V(6)).
4. Clarify if other routes of administration will be needed to be consistent with prior procedures.
5. Protocol personnel need to complete the required training.

**Chairmanship transferred back to Dr. Timmins following the vote on 840 (WU00TE 25-11-01).**

**IBC ID:** 841 (WU00TE 25-11-02R)
**PI:** Wu
**Title:** Countermeasures against Biothreat Pathogens Utilizing BSL-2 Pathogens
**Description:** The lab works on vaccines against respiratory pathogens such as Francisella *tularensis* and Yersinia pestis, which causes tularemia and plague, respectively. Currently, we are trying to identify different applications for a nanolipoprotein particle (NLP)-based vaccine platform capable of presenting chemically diverse antigens and adjuvants to the immune system. We have 3 projects that involve this platform: 1) Develop a single NLP-based vaccine that can simultaneously protect against multiple viral and bacterial pathogens; 2) Use immunogenicity and efficacy data generated with NLP and other subunit vaccines to develop a machine-learning tool to speed up vaccine development process to (aka RAPTER); 3) determine whether encapsulation of vaccines to confer both immediate- and extended-release properties can reduce the number of immunizations required to induce protective immunity and, at the same time, improve vaccine stability outside of cold-chain.
**Agents:** Listeria monocytogenes (DP-L4056) gene inserts (ΔactA, ΔinlB, ΔuvrAB, prfAG155S); Listeria monocytogenes (LM677) gene inserts (IgIC); Francisella tularensis gene inserts (SCHU S4ΔclpB, SCHU S4ΔclpB/ΔfupA, SCHU S4ΔclpB/ΔcapA, SCHU S4ΔclpB/ ΔwbtC); Francisella. tularensis (LVS)
**Human Material:** No
**Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid:** III-D-1-a
**Wild-type:** Yes
**Proposed BSL:** A/BSL-2
**Reviewer:** Muller

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the

following contingencies were adopted**. Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at A/BSL-2 practices:**

1. Protocol personnel need to complete the required training.
2. Correct the lay abstract spelling of the word plague.
3. Update section V(1) to document that safety centrifuge devices will be surface decontaminated prior to removing from the BSC and after centrifugation procedures.
4. Provide more details on containment devices and animal restraining devices that will be employed when animal procedures cannot be safely conducted inside a BSC in section (V(1)).
5. Provide documentation or a rationale as to why it is unlikely that samples shipped to outside investigators will contain live vaccine in section (V(3)).
6. Provide documentation to support the classification of post-vaccinated animal specimens as "Exempt Animal Specimens" instead of Category B (UN 3373) Biological Substances. Update section V(3) of the protocol with the requested information.
7. Confirm that the BHC/Biosafety posted BSC and Laboratory spill cleanup procedures will be followed (V)(5)).
8. Clarify if all the vaccinated animals will be managed the same on the protocol, and edit your response in section (V(9)).
9. The protocol states, "We expect symptoms of SCHU S4ΔclpB exposure to be no worse than those reported for LVS". Provide documentation to support this assertion.
10. Provide omitted addenda C(II) details for gene inserts/deletions (i.e., Potential potency of DNA insert(s) (e.g., oncogenic, virulent, toxic).

**8. <u>Significant Modifications</u>**

**IBC ID:** 835 (WEICJA 23-05-01R A)
**PI:** Weick
**Title:** Molecular mechanisms of endolysosomal support of synaptic function
**Description:** We are requesting the addition of some new transgenes, including two new reporters that both will drive GFP in response to the presence of tyrosine hydroxylase, a major enzyme expressed by catecholaminergic neurons such as those that release dopamine (DA), norepinephrine (NE), and epinephrine (E). Two vectors have been purchased (pAAV2.5-THP-GFP and pAAV-pTH-iCre:EGFP-WPREpA) and the transgenes will be cloned into the pFCK vector to be expressed in neurons in vitro. The second set of vectors that have been ordered (pCSC-ASCL1-IRES-GFP-T2A-Sox11, pCSC-LHX8-IRES-GBX1) will be used to express the transcription factors. A third vector has the gRNA sequence that will allow us to knockout Amyloid Precursor Protein (APP) in human cells.
**Agent:** Lentiviral Vector rNA gene inserts (TH-GFP, TH-CRE-GFP, APP, Sox11, Lhx8, Gbx1); pCSC-ASCL1-IRES-GFP-T2A-Sox11, pCSC-LHX8-IRES-GBX1.
**Human Material:** Yes
**Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid:** III-D-3-a
**Wild-type:** No
**Proposed BSL:** A/BSL-2
**Reviewer:** Bradfute

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the

following contingencies were adopted**. Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at A/BSL-2 practices:**

1. Make sure all plasmid maps for new plasmids/vectors are added to the addendum.

**NOTE: Dr. Bradfute was placed in a waiting room during the review of 837 (BRADST 24-11-01 A) and 842 (BRADST 23-02-01R F).**

**IBC ID:** 837 (BRADST 24-11-01 A)
**PI:** Bradfute
**Title:** Aerosol infection of mice with Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus to test host responses and countermeasure efficacy
**Description:** The site of exposure will be changed to the footpad and the maximum volume will be reduced to 50µL. Footpad injection is a commonly used route of exposure for arboviruses including VEEV. Groups of mice will be infected with control article, low dose of TC-83, high dose of TC-83, low dose of TrD, or high dose of TrD by whole body aerosol, intranasal, and subcutaneous via the footpad routes.
**Agent:** Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEEV)-TrD and TC83
**Human Material:** No
**Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid:** N/A
**Wild-type:** Yes
**Proposed BSL:** A/BSL-3
**Reviewer:** Timmins
The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted**. Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at A/BSL-3 practices:**

1. During animal procedures, please consider using restraints to avoid needle sticks.
2. Spoke with IBC members about footpad injections. This is a specialized technique and is considered both an intradermal and subcutaneous injection, so if this is what the PI wants to do, it should be kept on the IBC and specifically described (as it is here).
    a. A suggested alternative to footpad injections is a hock injection (above the ankle) to be able to utilize the same draining lymph node and a non-weight-bearing structure.
    b. For IACUC purposes, a footpad injection will require daily checks for locomotion and self-mutilation of the mice injected in their footpads. Pain meds and/or euthanasia should be considered if these sequelae occur.
    c. However, if the PI wants to simulate where mosquitoes bite, that has been reported to be the footpad, ears, and muzzle of rodents. The muzzle/ears would be impossible to inject in.

**IBC ID:** 842 (BRADST 23-02-01R F)
**PI:** Bradfute
**Title:** Immunity and therapeutics for viruses
**Description:** In this amendment we request the addition of a newly discovered BSL2 paramyxovirus, Cedar virus (CEDV), which is not known to cause human disease. We will conduct experiments to evaluate immune responses and test antiviral small molecules against viral infection and replication in accordance with the procedures approved for other viruses on this protocol.

**Agent:** Cedar virus (CEDV) (Henipavirus-Cedar virus strain CG1a) and Cedar virus (CEDV) (Henipavirus-Cedar virus strain CG1a) rNA inserts (Luciferase, GFP and Nano-Luciferase)
**Human Material:** No
**Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid:** III-D-3-a
**Wild-type:** Yes
**Proposed BSL:** A/BSL-2
**Reviewer:** Adema

The Primary Reviewer provided a summary report. The committee decided that the safety precautions would mitigate the risks to lab personnel, the public, and the environment to an acceptable level if the following contingencies were adopted**. Protocol approved contingent upon completion of the following contingencies at A/BSL-2 practices:**

1. Describe the modification in Addendum F. Which experiments from the original proposal will be conducted using the novel virus?

**Note: Following the vote on 842 (BRADST 23-02-01R F), Dr. Bradfute returned to the meeting.**

## 9. Notifications (administrative approvals by BHC)

**Notifications simultaneous with initiation**

- None

**Personnel Addition / Removal**

- 639 (FEROMA 21-02-01R); Addition and Removal
- 674 (GILLJE 21-11-01R); Addition
- 675 FRIEKA 21-11-01 (Prior DOMMDA 21-11-01); Removal
- 705 (FAN0HU 22-11-01R); Removal
- 709 (VUE0TO 22-11-01R); Addition/Removal
- 740 (TUNCEL 23-08-01R); Addition
- 760 (GANEAR 23-11-01R); Addition and Removal
- 778 (FEROMA 24-02-01R); Addition and Removal
- 799 (NOORSH 24-11-01R); Removal
- 800 (BARTER 24-11-01R); Addition and Removal
- 801 (MARCDA 24-11-01R); Removal
- 802 (NEUMAA 24-11-01); Removal
- 803 (KELLAL 24-11-01R); Addition and Removal
- 804 (SINGGU 24-11-01R); Addition and Removal
- 805 (PENTNA 24-11-01R); Removal
- 806 (PICCSA 24-11-01R); Addition and Removal
- 810 (FEROMA 25-02-01R); Addition and Removal
- 812 (KELLAL 25-02-01R): Addition
- 826 (BRADST 22-11-01 D); Removal
- 757 (ELGHAM 23-11-01); Addition

- 762 (WALKMA 23-11-01R); Addition and Removal

**Room Changes**

- None

**Other Admin Changes**

- None

**10. <u>Protocol Closures-</u>**

- 625 (GONZLA 20-11-01R) (Prior KANANA 20-11-01R)
- 626 (WU00TE 20-11-01R)
- 627 (WU00TE 20-11-02)

**11. <u>Annual Reviews -</u>**

- 800 BARTER 24-11-01R
- 713 BRADST 22-11-01
- 761 BRADST 23-11-01
- 811 BRADST 24-11-01
- 757 ELGHAM 23-11-01
- 705 FAN0HU 22-11-01R
- 675 FRIEKA 21-11-01 (Prior DOMMDA 21-11-01)
- 760 GANEAR 23-11-01R
- 674 GILLJE 21-11-01R
- 803 KELLAL 24-11-01R
- 764 KIM0TA 23-11-01R
- 801 MARCDA 24-11-01R
- 711 NATVDO 22-11-01
- 802 NEUMAA 24-11-01
- 799 NOORSH 24-11-01R
- 805 PENTNA 24-11-01R
- 806 PICCSA 24-11-01R
- 714 PROSER 22-11-01R
- 710 RAJAJA 22-11-01R
- 758 SALIIR 23-11-01R
- 804 SINGGU 24-11-01R
- 712 STEIMA 22-11-01R
- 709 VUE0TO 22-11-01R
- 762 WALKMA 23-11-01R

**12. <u>Adjourn</u>** –10:20 am